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11 Introduction
In this paper we consider insurance prices (premia) in presence of an incomplete
and competitive market for ﬁnancial securities. Because of market incomplete-
ness, while some insurance contracts can be replicated by ﬁnancial portfolios
traded on the market, in general they cannot.
Given a set X of insurance contracts, our purpose is to identify and study
the consequences of some simple conditions on the insurance price functional
H : X → R that we expect to be satisﬁed by any price schedule arising from
the interaction of rational agents in this incomplete market structure. Our
ﬁrst result, Theorem 1, says that under these conditions there exists a unique
compact and convex set Q of probabilities and a unique discount factor v such
that





for all insurance contracts X, and such that




for all Q ∈ Q and all insurance contracts X replicable on the market, where
V (X) is the market price of the asset that replicates X.
Eq. (2) guarantees that all the probabilities in Q are risk neutral, that
is, consistent with the market. On the other hand, the non-singleton nature
of the set Q, the key feature of Eq. (1), reﬂects the ambiguity due to the
market imperfections, whose presence limits the information otherwise available
to agents.
In Theorems 3 and 4 we reﬁne the result by decomposing the price H (X)
in two parts, net premium and safety loading, thus generalizing to our setting a
decomposition common in the insurance literature. Speciﬁcally, we show that,
under an additional natural assumption, Eq. (1) becomes








where P is a base probability in the set Q and AmbQ (X) is a suitable measure
of the ambiguity level of contract X (see Deﬁnition 2).
Mathematically, our results extend the decision-theoretic works of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989), Siniscalchi (2000), and are related to recent works
of Chateauneuf, Kast, and Lapied (1996), Wang, Young, and Panjer (1997),
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999), Delbaen (2000). Our contribution
is threefold: (i) We consider market consistency, an obviously important issue
in pricing insurances. (ii) We provide a decomposition of the price functional
in net premium and safety loading, a convenient representation for insurance
purposes. (iii) We consider general, possibly unbounded, contracts on possibly
inﬁnite state spaces; this is achieved by only imposing weak structural require-
ments on the sets of contracts, and without assuming the existence of an a priori
probability on Ω.
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lists and discusses the require-
ments on the markets and Section 3 on the price functionals. Section 4 is devoted
to results, while all proofs are relegated to the Appendix (Section 6), after the
ﬁnal remarks of Section 5.
2 Markets
We consider one period of uncertainty. At date 0 agents buy ﬁnancial contracts
in a competitive and frictionless incomplete market and insurance contracts
from insurance ﬁrms, for consumption at time T. Let Ω be the state space and
F the event σ-ﬁeld at time T. A contract, ﬁnancial or insurance, is described
by a random variable X : Ω → R, where X (ω) represents its payoﬀ at time T if
state ω obtains. We denote by B0 (Ω,F) the set of all simple random variables,
by B(Ω,F) the set of all bounded random variables, and by M(Ω,F) the set of
all bounded below random variables. If X is a random variable and β is a real
number, the random variable X ∧ β, deﬁned by
(X ∧ β)(ω) = min{X (ω),β}
for ω ∈ Ω, represents a stop-loss contract providing a coverage X (ω) if X (ω) <
β and β otherwise.
Let X be the set of all insurance contracts. Usually, such contracts are
represented by nonnegative, possibly unbounded, random variables; that is,
X ⊆ M+ (Ω,F) (see assumption S.1 below). However, when surrenders are
taken into account, insurance ﬁrms have to price also nonpositive random vari-
ables. Moreover, they may want to sell X1 and buy back X2 at the same time,
and consequently they may have to deal with the real-valued random variable
X1 − X2. For these reasons, we will also consider the case X ⊆ M(Ω,F) (see
assumption S.2 below).
Let Y be the set of the payoﬀs of all possible portfolios of ﬁnancial securities
traded on the market. We assume that the riskless bond 1Ω, which pays 1 in
each state of the world, is traded on the market, and that each element of Y
is bounded.1 An insurance contract is replicable if there exists a portfolio of
ﬁnancial securities with the same payoﬀs as the contract.
Speciﬁcally, we will make one of the two following assumptions on the market
structure:
S.1 Y is a subset of B(Ω,F) containing 1Ω and such that Y + 1Ω ∈ Y for all




0 (Ω,F) ⊆ X ⊆ M+ (Ω,F).
S.2 Y is a subset of B(Ω,F) containing 1Ω, X ∧ n ∈ X for all X ∈ X and all
n ≥ 1, and
hYi + B0 (Ω,F) ⊆ X ⊆ M(Ω,F).
1See Remark 6 in Section 5.
3The ﬁrst assumption is in line with the classic approach, in which insurance
contracts are nonnegative random variables, while the second one allows for
surrenders and buy backs too.
More importantly, assumptions S.1 and S.2 do not require neither Y nor
X to be vector spaces, thus making it possible to model markets with trading
constraints (e.g., ﬁnancial markets with selling limitations).
Notice that these assumptions are satisﬁed in some popular settings. For
example, S.1 clearly holds if Y is a convex cone in B(Ω,F) containing 1Ω and
X = B+ (Ω,F) or X = M+ (Ω,F);
while S.2 holds if Y is a subset of B(Ω,F) containing 1Ω and
X = B(Ω,F) or X = M(Ω,F).
3 Prices
In this section we present and discuss some properties of insurance policies’
prices that we expect to be satisﬁed by any price schedule arising from the
interaction of rational agents. These properties are based on few economic
assumptions:
• competition between insurance ﬁrms pares policies’ prices, so that, with-
out loss of generality, we can focus on a single insurance ﬁrm;
• no arbitrage opportunities are left to customers;
• the ﬁnancial market is frictionless and without arbitrage opportunities,
that is, there exists a ﬁnitely additive probability Q such that the market
price functional V : Y → R is given by




for all Y ∈ Y (a probability Q such that Eq. (3) holds is called risk
neutral or risk adjusted). Since it causes no loss of generality, we assume
v = V (1Ω) = 1.2
Let H : X → R∪{∞} be the insurance price functional in terms of consump-
tion at date 0; H (X) is the price for insurance contract X, that is, the price
at which the ﬁrm sells it to customers (when H (X) is inﬁnite, it simply means
that the ﬁrm will not cover X). We now present and discuss some desirable
properties of the price schedule H, based on the economic assumptions we just
spelled out. We start with three standard properties.
A.1 Internality: H (X) ≤sup
ω∈Ω
X (ω) for all X ∈ X.
2See Remark 5 in Section 5.
4This is a natural price condition: in presence of a ﬁnancial market, if it held
H (X) > supX, any customer needing a coverage of X would buy supX units
of the riskless bond rather than the ﬁrm’s policy.
A.2 Positive homogeneity: H (αX) = αH (X) for all α ∈ [0,1] and all X ∈ X
such that αX ∈ X.
According to A.2, premia are independent of the particular currency in which
they are denominated. In addition, there are no transaction costs for propor-
tional coverages, a liquidity requirement on the ﬁrm.
A.3 Subadditivity: H (X1 + X2) ≤ H (X1) + H (X2) for all X1,X2 ∈ X such
that X1 + X2 ∈ X.
This is another natural price condition: if for some X1 and X2 it held
H (X1 + X2) > H (X1)+H (X2), a customer would buy X1 and X2 separately
rather than X1 + X2.
Notice that, under A.1 and A.2, subadditivity implies that
H (X) + H (−X) ≥ 0 and inf X ≤ H (X) ≤ supX, (4)
for all X ∈ X such that −X ∈ X. As buying X back is the same as selling −X,
−H (−X) is simply the surrender value for X and so Eq. (4) means that the net
balance of the ﬁrm for surrenders is nonnegative and no arbitrage opportunity
is left to customers, who cannot form at a negative cost a portfolio of insurance
contracts with nonnegative payoﬀs.3
A functional H satisfying A.2 and A.3 is called sublinear. Internality and
sublinearity are standard assumptions for insurance prices. The next assump-
tion is, in contrast, peculiar to our analysis.
A.4 Consistency with the market: H (X + Y ) = H (X)+V (Y ) for all X ∈ X
and all Y ∈ Y such that X + Y ∈ X.
According to A.4, whenever part of an insurance contract can be replicated
by a portfolio of ﬁnancial securities, the price of that part equals the market
price of the replicating portfolio. This is a reasonable price assumption: if it
held H (X + Y ) > H (X) + V (Y ), customers needing a coverage of X + Y
would buy insurance X from the ﬁrm and the portfolio Y on the market. On
the other hand, if it held H (X + Y ) < H (X) + V (Y ), customers needing a
coverage of X would buy the insurance X + Y and sell Y on the market, thus
paying H (X + Y ) − V (Y ) < H (X). Notice that A.4 and A.2 imply that
H (Y ) = V (Y ) for all Y ∈ Y ∩ X.
We conclude with two continuity axioms. The ﬁrst one allows us to deal
with unbounded contracts, and it requires that the price of any contract can
be obtained by approximation from below. The axiom is trivially satisﬁed if X
consists of bounded random variables.
3Although surrenders may be seen as arbitrage opportunities for the ﬁrms, notice that the
decisions to buy insurance contracts, or to sell them back, are taken by agents (and not by
ﬁrms).
5A.5 Subcontinuity: H (X) = limn H (X ∧ n) for all X ∈ X such that eventu-
ally X ∧ n ∈ X.
The next axiom will ensure the countable additivity of the probabilities
involved in Theorem 1.
A.6 Outer Continuity: if {Xn}n≥1 ⊆ B
+
0 (Ω,F) ∩ X is such that Xn ↓ X ∈ X,
then limn H (Xn) = H (X).
4 Results
4.1 Representation
We can now state our pricing result. In reading it, recall that X is not required
to be a vector space and that the price of an unbounded insurance contract can
well be inﬁnite.
Theorem 1 Let the market structure satisfy either S.1 or S.2. Then, the fol-
lowing statements are equivalent:
(i) The functional H : X → R ∪ {∞} satisﬁes A.1-A.6.
(ii) There exists a unique weak compact and convex set Q of countably additive






Remark. For each bounded X ∈ X the sup appearing in Eq. (5) is a max.
In other words, under assumptions A.1-A.6, premia are ﬁxed by considering
the maximum expected loss relative to a family Q of risk neutral probabilities.
The non-singleton nature of Q reﬂects the ambiguity due to the limited infor-
mation that consumers and ﬁrms have in dealing with contracts that are not
replicable by the market. The fact that, in general, Q is a proper subset of
the set of all risk neutral probabilities reﬂects some form of market power of
ﬁrms, for example due to some better information that they may have based on
historical records, sector studies, and so on.
Mathematically, Theorem 1 extends a result proved by Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989) in a decision-theoretic setting, and it is related to some recent results
of Chateauneuf, Kast, and Lapied (1996), Wang, Young, and Panjer (1997),
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999), Delbaen (2000). Relative to these
papers, Theorem 1 has two main novel features: (a) it allows market consis-
tency, and (b) it considers contracts on a general measurable space, under weak
structural assumptions and without assuming the existence of a priori proba-
bility on Ω, an ad hoc assumption which seems diﬃcult to interpret. In our
result, probabilities pop up directly from market properties.
64.2 Decomposition
We now reﬁne the representation in Theorem 1. In the insurance literature it is
usual to decompose the price H (X) in two parts, the net premium – that is, the
expected payment E (X) of X – and the safety loading, which, in some sense,
measures the riskiness of X. For example, the standard deviation principle
suggests
H (X) = E (X) + γ
p
Var(X)
where γ is a positive constant, while the variance principle, the standard semi-
deviation principle, and the semi-variance principle are similar with respectively
Var(X),
p
SemiVar(X), and SemiVar(X) in place of
p
Var(X).
Under the following assumption, inspired by Siniscalchi (2000), it is possible
to provide a decomposition of this type in our setting.
A.7 Symmetry: for all X1,X2 ∈ X such that −X1,−X2, X1 + X2, and
−(X1 + X2) belong to X, we have
H (X1)+H (X2)+H (−(X1 + X2)) = H (X1 + X2)+H (−X1)+H (−X2).
According to this assumption, on the ﬁrm’s net balance it has the same eﬀect
either to sell X1 and X2 separately and then buy them back together, or to sell
X1 and X2 together and buy them back separately. As the surrender value for X
is −H (−X), this can be paraphrased as follows: the net balance of the ﬁrm for
surrenders does not depend on the decomposition of the contracts. For example,
the standard deviation and the variance principles are both symmetric, while
the standard semi-deviation and semivariance principles are not.
To state the result, we introduce a notion of safety loading appropriate for
our setting.
Deﬁnition 2 The ambiguity level of a contract X with respect to a set Q of
probabilities is














with the convention ∞ − ∞ = 0.
The nonsingleton nature of Q reﬂects the limited information due to the
markets’ incompleteness, and AmbQ (X) measures the impact of this limited
information on the contract X. The higher AmbQ (X) is, the more limited is
the information on which the pricing of X is based.
Theorem 3 Let the market structure satisfy S.2. The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) The functional H : X → R ∪ {∞} satisﬁes A.1–A.7.
7(ii) There exists a unique weak compact, symmetric, and convex set Q of















Q is the center of symmetry
of Q.4
In other words, a family Q of risk neutral probabilities is considered and one
of them is selected by fair weighting. Insurance contracts are then priced by
their net premia with respect to P, plus a safety loading based on the ambiguity
level of X.
Theorem 3 extends to our insurance setting a recent representation result
proved by Siniscalchi (2000) in the decision-theoretic setting of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). Besides market consistency and unbounded contracts, the
contribution of Theorem 3 is the term AmbQ (X), which in our insurance set-
ting can be interpreted as a safety loading, but that, more generally, is a natural
ambiguity level.
Example. Let Q = {αQ1 + (1 − α)Q2 : α ∈ [0,1]}, that is, suppose that Q1
and Q2 are the relevant countably additive and risk neutral probabilities. The
set Q is weak compact, symmetric, and convex with center of symmetry P =







, by Theorem 3, the







































































































4The set Q is symmetric if there exists a probability P, the center of symmetry, such that
(2P − Q) ∈ Q for all Q ∈ Q.
8where m is an even Borel measure over the relative boundary ∂ (Q − Q) of
Q − Q. In other words, we can view the ambiguity level as the result of ﬁrms’
subjective weighting over the spreads Q − Q, with the weighting given by the
measure m.
It turns out that, by using some results in convex geometry, we can establish
the same characterization of the ambiguity level for generalized zonoids, an
important family of ﬁnite dimensional symmetric sets. Speciﬁcally, a zonoid is
a limit of ﬁnite sums of line segments (the zonotopes). If there exist zonoids Q1
and Q2 such that Q1 = Q + Q2, then Q is a generalized zonoid (see Appendix
6.1.1 for more details).
Theorem 4 Let Q be a (generalized) zonoid of risk neutral probabilities. Then
there exists a unique even (signed) measure m over the Borel σ-algebra of













An extension of this result to all ﬁnite dimensional symmetric sets Q can
be obtained by replacing the even measure m with a suitable even distribution,
along the lines of Weil (1976) (see Appendix 6.1.1).
5 Concluding Remarks
1. Next we provide a ﬁnitely additive version of Theorem 3, where we drop the
outer continuity axiom A.6.
Proposition 5 Suppose either S.1 and B+ (Ω,F) ⊆ X or S.2 and B(Ω,F) ⊆ X.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The functional H : X → R ∪ {∞} satisﬁes A.1-A.5.
(ii) There exists a unique weak* compact and convex set Q of ﬁnitely additive






In addition, if S.2, B(Ω,F) ⊆ X, and A.7 hold, Q is symmetric, weak compact,














Q is the center of symmetry of Q.
9Notice that the set Q in Eq. (7) is weak compact and not just weak* com-
pact. This is a signiﬁcant improvement because, by the classic Eberlein-Smulian
Theorem, Q is also sequentially compact, a very convenient property.
2. Theorem 1 turns out to be fully in the spirit of an old work of de Finetti
and Obry (1933), who write: “...consideriamo contemporaneamente un certo
numero di tariﬀari additivi e determiniamo il prezzo dei singoli stati calcolando
secondo il tariﬀario che per ciascuno di essi risulta pi` u gravoso: con questo pro-
cedimento otteniamo il pi` u generale sistema di prezzi che soddisﬁ la ...[positiva
omogeneit` a]... e consenta il criterio ...[di subadditivit` a]...”5
3. All our results remain true if, instead of internality, we assumed monotonicity,
that is, X1 ≥ X2 ⇒ H (X1) ≥ H (X2).
4. If H (X1 + X2) = H (X1) + H (X2) for all comonotonic X1,X2 ∈ X with





the Choquet expected value of X with respect to C (·) =max
Q∈Q
Q(·). This is
consistent with the axiomatization of Wang, Young, and Panjer (1997).
5. If 0 < V (1Ω) = v 6= 1 everything still works, with some obvious changes.




6. If the riskless bond is not traded on the market, the discount factor is no
longer ﬁxed. Up to some minor changes, our analysis still holds. For example,





6 Appendix: proofs and related material
The proof of the main theorem relies on some lemmas, which might be of some
interest on their own. We state and prove them, and we then move to the proofs
of the results in subsection 6.4.
6.1 Envelopes of linear functionals
Let (E,≥) be an ordered vector space and U a nonempty subset of E. We
denote by hUi the span of U in E.
A functional I from E to R is said to be U-additive if I (x + u) = I (x)+I (u)
for all x ∈ E and all u ∈ U. We denote by E0 the set of all linear functionals on
E, and if f ∈ E0 we write f (x) or hx,fi indiﬀerently. If (E,τ) is a topological
vector space, E∗ denotes the subset of E0 consisting of τ-continuous functionals.
Next lemma extends a simple result proved in Marinacci (1997).
5“...let us consider a given number of additive tariﬀs and determine the price of each
position by taking the highest: in this way we obtain the most general price system satisfying
...[positive homogeneity]... and ...[subadditivity]...”
10Lemma 6 A functional I : E → R is sublinear, U-additive and such that
I (x) ≤ 0 for all x ≤ 0 if and only if there exists a unique convex and σ (E0,E)-
compact set K of linear and monotone functionals on E, with f|hUi = I|hUi for




for all x ∈ E. Moreover, if (E,τ) is a topological vector space and I is τ-
continuous, all functionals f ∈ K are τ-continuous.
Proof. For all u ∈ U and all x ∈ E, I (x) = I (x − u + u) = I (x − u) + I (u),






= I (x) +







= I (x) +
αI (u). So that, for all x ∈ X and all
Pn
i=1 αiui ∈ hUi (with αi ∈ R and






































and I is hUi-addititive. W.l.o.g., we can assume that U is a subspace of E.
Set
K = {f ∈ E0 : f(x) ≤ I(x) for all x ∈ E and f (u) = I (u) for all u ∈ U}.
Clearly K is convex and σ (E0,E)-compact. If x ≥ 0, then −x ≤ 0, f(−x) ≤
I(−x) ≤ 0 and f (x) ≥ 0. Thus K consists of positive linear functionals. Choose
b x ∈ E and consider the following two cases.
1. If b x ∈ E\U. Set Eb x = {αb x + u : α ∈ R,u ∈ U}. Let fb x be the linear
functional on Eb x deﬁned by
fb x (αb x + u) = αI (b x) + I (u).
We have fb x (αb x + u) = I (αb x + u) if α ≥ 0, while, if α < 0, fb x (αb x + u) =
−I (−αb x − u) ≤ I (αb x + u). Thus, fb x (x) ≤ I(x) for all x ∈ Eb x.
2. Else b x ∈ U. Set Eb x = U and fb x (x) = I(x) for all x ∈ Eb x. Clearly,
fb x (x) ≤ I(x) for all x ∈ Eb x.
11In both cases we have fb x (x) ≤ I(x) for all x ∈ Eb x. By the Hahn-Banach
Theorem there exists a linear functional b f on E such that b f(x) = fb x(x) for all
x ∈ Eb x, and b f(x) ≤ I(x) for all x ∈ E. Therefore, b f ∈ K, and
I(b x) = b f(b x) =max
f∈K
f(b x).
Suppose that I (·) =max
g∈C
g (·) for another convex and σ (E0,E)-compact set C of
linear functionals on E. W.l.o.g., there exists g ∈ C\K; by a standard separation
result (see Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, Theorem V.2.10), there exists x ∈ E,




Finally, if f ∈ K and {xj} is a net in E such that xj
τ → 0, then
−I (−xj) ≤ −f (−xj) = f (xj) ≤ I (xj),
and hence f (xj) → 0 whenever I is τ-continuous.




for all x ∈ E. The functional I (x) − I (−x) is linear if and only if K is
symmetric. In this case:
1. The only center of symmetry of K is the functional
b f (x) =
1
2
(I (x) − I (−x)) ∀x ∈ E.
2. The following identities hold










x, b f − f
E 
 ∀x ∈ E.
Proof. Let K be symmetric and b f be a center of symmetry for K. Let x ∈ E,











hx,fi, and let f∗ = 2b f − f∗. If f∗ / ∈argmin
g∈K
hx,gi, there exists
g∗ ∈ K such that hx,g∗i < hx,f∗i. Hence,
D












x,2b f − f∗
E
= hx,f∗i,
which is absurd, since 2b f − g∗ ∈ K. Therefore,
I (x) − I (−x) = hx,f∗i + hx,f∗i =
D







12Hence I (x) − I (−x) is linear and b f is unique.
Conversely, if I (x) − I (−x) is linear, set b f (x) = 1
2 (I (x) − I (−x)) for all
x ∈ E. Let f0 ∈ K, we have
D
x,2b f − f0
E





hx,gi − hx,f0i ≥min
g∈K
hx,gi
for all x ∈ E. If 2b f −f0 / ∈ K, by a standard separation result (see Dunford and
Schwartz, 1958, Theorem V.2.10), there exists x0 ∈ E, c ∈ R, and ε > 0 such
that
D
x0,2b f − f0
E
≤ c−ε < c ≤ hx0,gi for all g ∈ K. Hence,
D










(I (x) − I (−x)) +
1
2













































hx,−gi = hx,f∗i+hx,−g∗i = hx,f∗ − g∗i ≤ max
f,g∈K
hx,f − gi.
The converse inequality is trivial.






















x, b f −
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x, b f − f
E
, thus































x, b f − f
E
 .
This concludes the proof.
136.1.1 Finite dimensional case
We will now consider the case in which E is a normed space and K is a nonempty,
d-dimensional, convex, compact and symmetric subset of E∗, with center of
symmetry 0 (and hence K = −K). Let F be the span of K. If K is a ﬁnite sum
of line segments in F, all centered in the origin, it is a zonotope. If K is the
limit (in the Hausdorﬀ metric of F) of a sequence of zonotopes, it is a zonoid.
If there exist zonoids K1 and K2 such that K1 = K + K2, K is a generalized
zonoid. Any convex, compact subset of F which is symmetric about 0 belongs
to the closure in the Hausdorﬀ metric of generalized zonoids. If the center of
symmetry of K is b f 6= 0, we call K a zonotope, zonoid, generalized zonoid if
K − b f is respectively a zonotope, zonoid, generalized zonoid.
Let {f1,f2,...,fd} be a base for F. Then there exist {e1,e2,...,ed} ⊆ E
such that hej,fii = 1 if j = i and 0 otherwise. Letting V = he1,e2,...,edi
and F⊥ = {x ∈ E : g (x) = 0 ∀g ∈ F}, E = F⊥ ⊕ V . For all x ∈ E, denote by
v (x)













hv (x),fi = I (v (x)).
Consider the embedding
V → F
v 7→ e v














induced by the natural embedding of F in Rd. Notice that, for all v =
Pd
j=1 βjej ∈
V and all g =
Pd























 = (e v,g).
Therefore








We will denote by e I : F → R the functional
e I (g) =max
f∈K
(g,f).
Let K◦ and ∂K be the interior and boundary of K relative to F (notice that
0 ∈ K◦), and by S the unit sphere in F in the norm k·k induced by the inner
product.
14Remark 1 The projection of ∂K on S deﬁned by N : f 7→
f
kfk is a homeomor-
phism.
Remark 2 By the change of variable formula, for any continuous and positively



























Since K is bounded and 0 ∈ K◦, there exist α,β > 0 such that α < kfk < β for
all f ∈ ∂K, hence 1
kfk ∈ L1 (n)












A Borel measure m on a symmetric (about 0) Borel subset B of F is even
if m(A) = m(−A) for any Borel subset A of B (clearly ∂K is a symmetric
compact subset of F).
Proposition 8 If K is a (generalized) zonoid, then there exists an even (signed)





for all x ∈ E. Such m is unique.













for all v ∈ V . By Petty (1961), r is unique. Notice that |hv,·i| is continuous and
positively homogeneous and apply Remark 2 (with n and m deﬁned as there)
to obtain I(v) =
R
∂K |hv,fi|dm(f).
Let x = v⊥ (x) + v (x) ∈ E, then







Next we show that m is even and unique.
For all Borel subsets A of ∂K, N (−A) =
n
−g
k−gk : g ∈ A
o
= −N (A),
n(−A) = r(N (−A)) = r(−N (A)) = r(N (A)) = n(A), that is n is even.






∂K 1A (g) 1
kgkdn(g); apply the
change of variable M : ∂K → ∂K deﬁned by M (x) = −x to obtain m(A) = R
∂K 1A (−g) 1
k−gkdnM (g). Since nM = n, then m(A) =
R
∂K 1−A (g) 1
kgkdn(g) =
m(−A), and m is even.
Finally, let ¯ m be an even measure on ∂K such that I(x) =
R
∂K |hx,fi|d¯ m(f)
for all x ∈ E. Set ¯ n(A) =
R
A kfkd¯ m(f) =
R
∂K 1A (f)kfkd¯ m(f) for any Borel











































|(e v,s)|d¯ nN−1 (s).
Then, r = ¯ nN−1, whence n = rN = ¯ nN−1N = ¯ n, and m(A) =
R
∂K 1A (f) 1
kfkdn(f) =
R
∂K 1A (f) 1
kfkd¯ n(f) =
R
∂K 1A (f) 1
kfk kfkd¯ m(f) = ¯ m(A) for all Borel subsets
A of ∂K.
Similarly to what done in Weil (1976), let E be the space of all (positively
homogeneous) functions φ on F such that there exists a signed, even Borel








(mφ and rφ are unique), endowed with the topology of weak convergence of the
generating signed measures. Consider the linear and continuous functional on
E deﬁned by















, hence, |(·,f)| ∈ E and m|(·,f)| = 1
2δf +
1









2 e I (f) + 1
2 e I (−f) = e I (f).
For all h ∈ F, there exists α ≥ 0 and f ∈ ∂K such that h = αf, then e I (h) =
e I (αf) = αe I (f) = αT (|(·,f)|) = T (α|(·,f)|) = T (|(·,αf)|) = T (|(h,·)|). We
can conclude that, for all x = v⊥ (x) + v (x) ∈ E,














= T (|hv (x),·i|)
= T (|hx,·i|).
16For further details and interpretation of T as a distribution see Weil (1976).
6.2 Compact sets of countably additive set functions
The vector space generated by all ﬁnitely additive probabilities is denoted by
ba(Ω,F) and its elements are denoted by µ : F → R. Moreover, ca(Ω,F) is the
vector subspace of ba(Ω,F) consisting of countably additive set functions.





.6 Therefore ba(Ω,F) is endowed with a norm topol-
ogy, a weak topology, a weak* topology, and the product topology inherited by
ba(Ω,F) as a subset of RF. Notice that the product topology coincides with
the topology induced on ba(Ω,F) by the subspace B0 (Ω,F) of its predual. Next
lemma, which has an Eberlein-Smulian ﬂavor, shows the equivalence of diﬀerent
notions of compactness for subsets of ba(Ω,F). It is a simple variation on some
results of Dunford and Schwartz (1958) Section IV.9. For a proof we refer to
Chateauneuf, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Tallon (2002).
Lemma 9 Let M be a subset of ba(Ω,F). Consider the following statements:
a) M is weak* compact.
b) M is sequentially weak* compact.
c) M is cluster point weak* compact.
d) M is product compact.
e) M is weak compact.
We have that e)⇔b) ⇒a)⇔d) ⇒c), while all the conditions are equivalent
if M ⊆ ca(Ω,F).
The following result provides conditions under which a set of positive ﬁnitely
additive set functions is contained in ca(Ω,F).
Lemma 10 Let M be a weak* compact subset of ba+ (Ω,F). The following
statements are equivalent:
1. M ⊆ ca(Ω,F).
2. For all Xn,X ∈ B(Ω,F) such that Xn ↓ X, maxµ∈M
R
Ω Xndµ → maxµ∈M
R
Ω Xdµ.
3. For all An ∈ F such that An ↓ ∅, maxµ∈M µ(An) → 0.
6For all µ ∈ ba(Ω,F), kµkvar = sup
N P
i=1
|µ(Ai)|, where the sup is taken over all ﬁnite
partitions of Ω in F. For all X ∈ B (Ω,F), kXksup = sup|X (ω)|, where the sup is taken over
all ω ∈ Ω.
17Proof. 1.⇒2. For all n ≥ 1 consider the function




• hXn,·i is weak* continuous on M for all n ≥ 1.
• For all µ ∈ M, hXn,µi 7→ hX,µi (monotone convergence theorem) and,
moreover hX,·i is weak* continuous on M.
• For all n ≥ 1 and all µ ∈ M, hXn,µi ≥ hXn+1,µi.
Therefore, by the Dini Theorem hXn,·i uniformly converges to hX,·i. A
fortiori, maxµ∈M hXn,µi → maxµ∈M hX,µi.
2.⇒3. Obvious.
3.⇒1. For all An ∈ F such that An ↓ ∅, and all ¯ µ ∈ M: ¯ µ(An) ≤
maxµ∈M µ(An) → 0.
6.3 Suprema of integrals
The ﬁnal lemma is an approximation result.










































































Ω XdP > limn sup
P∈P
R


















6.4 Proofs of the results
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume ﬁrst that S.1 is satisﬁed. Set Z = hYi +
B0 (Ω,F) ⊆ B(Ω,F). Deﬁne a functional b H : Z → R by
b H (Z) = H (Z + γ) − γ
if γ ∈ R+ is such that Z+γ ∈ hYi
++B
+
0 (Ω,F) ⊆ X (for convenience, throughout
the proof we write γ in place of γ1Ω).
b H is well deﬁned. For, let Z = X0 + Y with X0 ∈ B0 (Ω,F) and Y ∈ hYi.
Clearly there exist ξ0,θ ∈ R+ such that X0 +ξ0 ∈ B
+
0 (Ω,F) and Y +θ ∈ hYi
+.
By setting γ = ξ0 +θ, we obtain Z +γ ∈ hYi
+ +B
+
0 (Ω,F). Hence, b H is deﬁned
on the whole Z. Next we show that its deﬁnition does not depend on γ. Assume
Z + γ,Z + β ∈ hYi
+ + B
+
0 (Ω,F). W.l.o.g. γ > β and
H (Z + γ) − γ = H (Z + β + γ − β) − γ.
















0 (Ω,F). Therefore, by A.2 and A.4


























+ γ − β − γ
= H (Z + β) − β.
We conclude that H (Z + γ) − γ = H (Z + β) − β.
Clearly if Z ∈ hYi
+ + B
+
0 (Ω,F), then b H (Z) = H (Z + 0) − 0 = H (Z); in
particular, b H (1) = 1 and b H (0) = 0.




0 (Ω,F) and α ≥ 0, then αZ + αγ ∈ hYi
+ + B
+
0 (Ω,F), by A.2
b H (αZ) = H (αZ + αγ) − αγ = H (α(Z + γ)) − αγ
= αH (Z + γ) − αγ = α b H (Z).




0 (Ω,F), then Z + γ + Z0 + γ0 ∈ hYi
+ + B
+
0 (Ω,F). By A.3
b H (Z + Z0) = H (Z + Z0 + (γ + γ0)) − (γ + γ0) =
= H ((Z + γ) + (Z0 + γ0)) − (γ + γ0) ≤
≤ H (Z + γ) + H (Z0 + γ0) − γ − γ0 =
= b H (Z) + b H (Z0).
This proves subadditivity. Now assume Z ∈ Z and Y ∈ Y, there exists n ∈ N




and an argument analogous to the one just used yield Y-additivity.





b H (Z) = H (Z + γ) − γ ≤ sup(Z + γ) − γ = supZ ≤ 0.
In sum, b H : Z → R is a sublinear, Y-additive functional such that b H (Z) ≤ 0 if
Z ≤ 0. By Lemma 6, there exists a convex and σ (Z0,Z)-compact set Φ of linear
and monotone functionals on Z, with φ(Y ) = b H (Y ) = V (Y ) for all Y ∈ Y and
all φ ∈ Φ, such that
b H (Z) =max
φ∈Φ
φ(Z)
for all Z ∈ Z. Since φ(1) = b H (1) = 1, for each φ there exists a unique (since





for all Z ∈ Z. Thus





for all Z ∈ Z, and




for all Y ∈ Y and all φ ∈ Φ. Let Q ={Pφ}φ∈Φ. It is easy to show that Q is
convex and weak* compact. By outer continuity, if {An} ⊆ F and An ↓ ∅, then
Q(An) =
R
Ω 1AndQ ≤ H (1An) → 0 for all Q ∈ Q. Hence the elements of Q are
countably additive.
Let X ∈ X be bounded and measurable. There exists a sequence {Xn}n≥1 ⊆
B0 (Ω,F)

















20Suppose that X is not necessarily bounded. Since X ∧n is bounded, by (9) and
Lemma 11, we have
H (X) = lim
n


















Uniqueness of Q is proved like uniqueness of Φ in Lemma 6. This completes
the proof of 1.⇒2. if S.1 is satisﬁed.
Conversely, consider a functional deﬁned on X by





where Q is a weak* compact and convex set of countably additive risk neutral
probabilities. It obviously satisﬁes A.1-A.4.
For all X ∈ X, by Lemma 11,
lim
n

















XdQ = H (X).
and H satisﬁes A.5. If {Xn}n≥1 ⊆ B
+
0 (Ω,F) is such that Xn ↓ X ∈ X, for all
















XdQ = H (X),
and A.6 is satisﬁed. A similar argument holds for S.2.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof only assumes that Q ⊆ba(Ω,F) in order to






for all X ∈ X. Notice that A.7 guarantees that H (X) − H (−X) is linear on
B0 (Ω,F), hence, by Lemma 7, Q is symmetric. Let P be the center of symmetry


















































21Let X ∈ X. Clearly, H (X) < ∞ implies
R
Ω XdP < ∞. Conversely, if R








XdP − inf X < ∞.
























































































































































































The rest is trivial.
Proof of Theorem 4. Just observe that for all X ∈ B(Ω,F), AmbQ (X) =
maxµ∈Q−Q
R
Xdµ and that, if Q is a (generalized) zonoid with center of sym-
metry P, then Q − Q =2(Q−P) is a (generalized) zonoid centered in 0; ﬁnally,
apply Proposition 8.
22Proof of Proposition 5. For the ﬁrst part of the proposition, it suﬃces to
follow the path of the proof of Theorem 1 with B(Ω,F)
+ in place of hYi
+ +
B0 (Ω,F)
+. Analogously the second part is proved like Theorem 3, with the
exception of weak compactness of Q. Notice for all Q ∈ Q and A ∈ F, 0 ≤
Q(A) ≤ 2P (A) for all A ∈ F. For all ε > 0, if P (A) < ε





uniformly for Q ∈ Q. By Theorem IV.9.12 in Dunford and Schwartz (1958), Q
is relatively sequentially weak compact, and, by the Eberlein-Smulian Theorem,
Q is relatively weak compact. But Q is weak* closed, then it is weak closed,
and compact.
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